Cinema, as a popular entertainment, has frequently been understood as a leisure activity, something undertaken in one's free time, the hours during which one has been freed from the demands of work. Popular cinema's plenitude-its abundance of image, sound, narrative, incident, and spectacle-differentiates itself, so the story could be told, from the physical and cognitive demands of the working day. Of course, critical theory taught us long ago that such a conceptualization of cinema was false: cinema, like other "amusements," was a continuation of the working day by other means, "the prolongation of work," an "after-image of the work process itself." 1 This illuminating insight, whatever its critical purchase on what is really at stake in cinema spectatorship, enjoys a counterfactual relation to what it is most people imagine themselves to be doing when they elect to go to the cinema and sit in the dark for ninety or more minutes. However false their consciousness may be, going to the movies is undertaken ostensibly as a dropping of tools.
By comparison, one of the many experiences and affects associated with what is commonly called "art cinema" is the apprehension of a burden-the burden of having to do some work. In art cinema spectatorship, the spectator looks forward to the film as the occasion of special mental alertness, attentiveness, and thoughtfulness. Not only might one be expected to read subtitles-perhaps the most obvious and banal marker that some effort is expected from the spectator-so must one attend with care to what is frequently the art film's "difficulty." By being difficult-hard to understand, hard to follow-the art film participates in and offers itself as a late-blooming example of aesthetic modernism's romance with the difficult. 2 One does not kick back and enjoy James Joyce's Ulysses or Gertrude Stein's Three Lives in quite the same way that one might devour even the most ruminative nineteenth-century novel. Similarly, Persona (Ingmar Bergman, 1966) , a paradigmatic instance of art cinema, would seem to demand, at least superficially, a different sort of attention than, say, Pillow Talk (Michael Gordon, 1959) , an emblematic instance of Hollywood entertainment. It would be hard to specify or to measure the attention required by each film. The latter, at one hour and forty-some-odd minutes in length, actually demands the spectator spend more time with it, whereas the former keeps its audience in its thrall for under ninety minutes. But spectators of Pillow Talk are more likely to believe that they understand what is actually happening at any given moment, and more likely to have a sense of what it all meant at its conclusion, than spectators of Persona, who quite likely will be asking themselves, moment-to-moment, what it is they understand; and may puzzle, for many hours or even days, over its significance. In short, it would seem that spectators of Persona have been given more to do and that what has been given to do is potentially infinite, or at the very least open-ended in terms of its temporality. (If I never manage to understand Persona, I might wonder if the film is almost like a task that I have never managed to complete.)
These characterizations of what distinguishes everyday film spectatorship (associated with Hollywood feature filmmaking and its global counterparts) from art cinema spectatorship are familiar enough to film scholars and cinephiles. The distinction I have drawn here is, for the purposes of argumentation, both obvious and a bit too stark. One may, for instance find that a popular film gives one more to think about than a putatively more serious art film, even if, perhaps giving the audience so much to meditate on may not have been the film's intention. Attitudes of reading and interpretation associated with one mode of spectatorship could be productively applied to another. That is, one might decide to watch a Bergman film with an attitude of relaxed bemusement and decline its apparent invitation to philosophical reflection. But in acknowledging these possibilities, and scrambling the responsibilities of spectatorship, one is at the same time still granting that a difference exists-that the art film at the very least pretends to a higher level of seriousness by way of the greater amount of cognitive work that it coaxes from its spectator.
>> Maximum Ambiguity and Active Subjects: Red deseRt Michelangelo Antonioni's Red Desert (1964) , a paradigmatic example of art cinema, follows its protagonist, Giuliana (Monica Vitti), as she pursues an aleatory, half-heartedly intense attempt to initiate an affair with Corrado (Richard Harris), an oil industry executive and colleague of her husband's. Giuliana is a wealthy wife and mother, a member of Italy's newly emergent postwar technocratic bourgeoisie. Because she has previously suffered some sort of nervous collapse, her mental fragility and stability are presented as objects of constant concern. Her prior illness is narrativized by the film, but also seems to hover over or pulsate in its every image, as an immanent force of disturbance. The film's visual design is notable for both its lushly unreal color design and its cinematography, which uses various techniques (such as the pictorial flattening of telephoto lens) to render the film's diegetic world in a mode of vivid abstraction. 3 In an influential essay "The 'Cinema of Poetry,'" Pier Paolo Pasolini argues that the film's visual style, tout court-not just this or that subjective or point-of-view shotexpresses analogically Giuliana's perspective. 4 The film's method of abstraction, which might, at the level of the image, seem to abstract us from psychological realism, is understood by Pasolini to be the sign, the index, of the psychological subject-and thus the absolute grounds of the film's intensified realism (or at least its psychological realism). The instances in the film of a pictorial style that verges on or privileges abstraction are numerous; indeed, these instances more or less make up the entirety of the film, thus verifying Pasolini's suggestion that Antonioni "looks at the world by immersing himself in his neurotic protagonist, reanimating the facts through her eyes." 5 As an example, Pasolini cites Giuliana and Corrado's visit to the house of a worker, whom Corrado hopes to convince to immigrate to South America with a team of other laborers. This same man, we have learned already, knows Giuliana from the time when they were both being treated in the same psychiatric clinic. As they arrive at the man's building, we see in the foreground of the shot two pink flowers, blurry and out of focus, that dominate the frame; while in the deeper recesses of the frame we can make out Giuliana and Corrado entering the building. A bit later the camera returns to these flowers, only this time they are in focus, or "aggressively in focus," in Pasolini's words. 6 The formal exaggeration of the flowers in these two shots indexes Giuliana's way of seeing and experiencing the world, which usurps Antonioni's so that the film is a record of this fictional character's perception-both sensory and psychological. But this is a ruse on Antonioni's part; it might make more sense to say that he has developed the character Giuliana in order to give free rein to his own sensibility. Such is Pasolini's take: "Antonioni has freed his most deeply felt moment: he has finally been able to represent the world seen through his eyes, because he has substituted in toto the world-view of a neurotic his own delirious view of aesthetics." 7 Pasolini's somewhat tendentious reading of the film-that it is essentially a registration, across its entire surface, of character consciousness-is compelling because it effectively grounds the film's peculiarities in the mental life of the fictional character. Thus, while its formal (especially visual and aural) exaggerations would seem to resist the category of "realism," the overarching strategy of the film delivers us into the realms of the sort of identification with characterological depth that we associate with realism and its accurate portrayal of the world (even or especially if our access to the world is through the distorted impressions of an individual mind). 8 Giuliana is both articulate and mute at different points across the film, drawing the film's spectators ever closer to the secret of her subjectivity. She wants to express how she "feels," while we want to understand and respond to her complex subjectivity. Her work-of managing herself-and our work-of managing to understand her and the film-come to feel like a particularly laborious enterprise, one that is both taxing and pleasurable: a kind of indolent busyness. David Bordwell, in an influential essay, "The Art Cinema as a Mode of Film Practice," attempts to "construct . . . the category" of art cinema by thinking through the sorts of mental labors that a film like Red Desert demands of its spectators. 9 Bordwell is particularly interested in Antonioni's (and, more generally, art cinema's) "psychologically complex" characters-like Claudia (also played by Monica Vitti) in L'avventura (1960) . 10 Bord well argues that if this kind of cinema's characters are hard to understand, its spectators are tutored, as it were (through festival programming, film journalism, etc.), to know how to comprehend such opaque characters and to see them, in turn, as signs of authorial expressivity: "A small industry is devoted to informing readers of such authorial marks." 11 Because these characters seem complicated and hard to figure out, like people in "real life," the art film exhibits a kind of realism, but because of the insistence of and on style (what Bordwell calls an "expressionist aesthetic"), this realism is also suspended or put in doubt. 12 Bordwell says that the art cinema "seeks to solve the problem" of the uneasy "merger" of classical narration and authorial stylization in a "sophisticated way":
The art film solicits a particular reading procedure: Whenever confronted with a problem in causality, temporality, or spatiality, we first seek realistic motivation. (Is a character's mental state causing the uncertainty? Is life just leaving loose ends?) If we're thwarted, we next seek authorial motivation. (What is being "said" here? What significance justifies the violation of the norm?) . . . Put crudely, the slogan of the art cinema might be, "When in doubt, read for maximum ambiguity." 13
The film (or Antonioni) works most assiduously when it is working to represent Giuliana's distracted, desultory mental life. In moments like the aforementioned shots of the flowers, the film theatrically foregrounds its labored attempts to produce an impression of her interiority. These same moments then force on us the labor of deciding what such images mean: do they belong to Giuliana, to Antonioni, or as Pasolini would have it, to both of them? Pasolini's essay confirms the logic of Bordwell's argument that formal exaggeration-or even abstraction-ultimately pivots back to the realism of a characterdriven cinematic narrative.
I want to pose the question of art cinema's labor a bit more literally, taking my cue from my prime example, Red Desert. In the opening sequences of the film, we see that labor qua labor, or rather the withdrawal of labor, is foregrounded. We see Giuliana arriving on foot with her son at the gates of a factory (a petrochemical refinery). Workers mill about as a car pulls up with a placard affixed to its rear passenger windows; the placard bears the word "sciopero" (strike), along with the initials CGIL, the acronym for Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro, or Italian General Confederation of Labor, the large trade union associated with the Italian Communist Party, or PCI, as it was then known. In this scene, the film immediately presents us with literal and thematic questions of labor. This representation of labor unrest is clearly meant to resonate with the famous events of 1962, when a wave of mass strikes in northern Italy, mostly involving workers in the automobile manufacturing industry, culminated in a general strike in July and major civic unrest in Turin, metonymized by the "riots" in Piazza Statuto. 14 The restiveness in this scene, however, is muted; what is shown looks more like diffuse angst than concerted political protest.
Interpreting Red Desert as a film about labor cuts against important lines of thinking that have understood this film as a treatment of modern anomie, ennui, or psychological malaise (a significant if repetitive strain in the writing on Antonioni), especially as such affects might be understood as symptoms of the postwar Italian "economic miracle." 15 Given, however, the fact that the film begins at the factory gates, we could just as plausibly argue that the film's manifest content is labor. Visible, and quite dramatically so, are at least three forms of labor: the classic, industrial or Fordist labor of factory workers, the managerial labor of Corrado and Giuliana's husband, Ugo (Carlo Chionetti), and the unwaged "affective" labor of the housewife and mother, Giuliana. The film also opens with two ways of not working: the striking workers' withdrawal of their labor and Giuliana's ambiguous fulfilment of her unwaged duties as caregiver to her child, Valerio (Valerio Bartoleschi). As the opening scene progresses, Giuliana momentarily abandons Valerio in order to buy a half-eaten sandwich from one of the striking workers, while Valerio looks on. Later in the film, Giuliana brings Corrado to an empty retail space where she plans to open a small boutique. Her intentions clearly seem to be to provide herself with some other horizon of meaning beyond that of childcare and domestic labor. This scene is famous for shots of Giuliana against walls on which large swatches of paint have been applied: we assume these are traces of Giuliana's decision-making about how to decorate the shop. But they achieve a certain formal and pictorial autonomy, like the other intrusive uses of color we see across the film. (This was Antonioni's first color film, and he clearly took it as an opportunity to test his control over this element of the film's plasticity.) In any case, the illegible, non-representational paint marks offer themselves up as potential analogues to Giuliana's unintelligible and abstracted interiority. Questions of work and questions of formal abstraction hover in the same atmosphere. 16 I want to read these elements of the film as proleptic of the crisis in the Italian and European organization of labor that would occur across the 1960s and 1970s, the effects of which were felt and theorized very acutely in Italian labor and left intellectual movements. Red Desert formally and thematically seems to index an intuition that work will not continue as it had done heretofore. The mechanization and computerization of factory labor during the 1960s and '70s would go on to create labor surpluses that resulted in resistance to these historical trends, as well as a diminishment of the ground for such resistance. The film's most stylized passages occur at the moments when the redefinition of labor is most at stake, thematically, formally, but also materially. This foregrounding of a style-a style that tends towards abstraction and that could easily and not only pejoratively be described as "belabored"-links problems of style and problems of work in powerful ways. In its uneasy encounter between reproductive labor and industrial labor in a moment of reciprocal crisis, we see the film prefiguring the rise of immaterial labor. In Maurizio Lazzarato's theory, we see a shift from a Fordist mode of production (in which the worker labors to produce concrete commodities) to a mode of labor that he describes as "a labor of control, of handling information, . . . a decision-making capacity that involves the investment of subjectivity. . . . [W]orkers are expected to become 'active subjects' in the coordination of the various functions of production. . . . [A] collective learning process becomes the heart of productivity." 17 This new worker, as it were, is more "subject"-that is to say, problem-solver, communicator, creative solution-finder-than physical laborer. Examples of immaterial labor would include computer-aided factory work; telesales and call center work; work in the communications sector and "creative industries"; and any form of work-which is almost all forms of work-in which formal job descriptions demand a "positive attitude," an appetite for teamwork, and so on. Seb Franklin has usefully characterized immaterial labor in the following terms: "On the one hand . . . immaterial labor simply accounts for a transformation of the quality of work performed within the physical and temporal boundaries of the workplace. On the other hand, it describes a radical dispersal of value production into all activity that adds value to an object or service, such as the combined attention and discussion required to define a 'must-have' item or a 'buzz' band." 18 The term is meant to be, for the most part, descriptive, naming the nature of the kind of work undertaken. Certainly there have long been forms of immaterial labor in capital-In its uneasy encounter between reproductive labor and industrial labor in a moment of reciprocal crisis, we see the film prefiguring the rise of immaterial labor.
ist economies-intellectual and artistic labor bear many of the traits of what has come to be defined as immaterial labor. The shift towards immaterial labor clearly does not eliminate physically demanding industrial labor. But even industrial manufacture is heavily influenced by the increasing hegemony of the logic of immaterial labor. Michael Hardt writes that "as industries are transformed, the division between manufacturing and services is becoming blurred. Just as through the process of modernization all production became industrialized, so too through the process of postmodernization all production tends toward the production of services, toward becoming informationalized." 19 The redefinition of the terms and forms of labor in Italy, and in the West more broadly, can be seen at work in Red Desert in a number of ways: in the story it tells (about a systematic weakening of the position of the industrial laborer), in its images (which depict these historical processes while also denaturing their representation), and in its address to and engagement of its spectators (which forces them into a mode of sensitive questioning). As a result, Antonioni's art cinema spectators seem to behave rather like his art cinema characters. In responding to Antonioni's stylized, lacunar representation of Giuliana's experience, as well as to Vitti's opaque performance style, spectators who watch her onscreen are encouraged-coerced, even-to share a fundamental thoughtful sensitivity towards the world; they, too, must exercise an open-ended interpretive creativity and forego hermeneutic conclusiveness. In so doing, however, these same spectators, also enter a long theoretical tradition that has associated film spectatorship with a kind of labor. Famously, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer regard cinema-going as an "after-image of the work process itself" (and therefore continuous with it), because films produced by the culture industry "are so designed that quickness, powers of observation, and experience are undeniably needed to apprehend them at all; yet sustained thought is out of the question if the spectator is not to miss the relentless rush of facts." 20 We discover again, a few decades later, the reciprocity between dominant mode of production and film spectatorship in Bordwell's description of art cinema spectatorship, which sounds like it could just as easily be describing the mental life of workers employed in the service and information sectors. In both scenarios spectators labor, but their labors are different insofar as they respond to different styles of filmmaking that reflect, but also, we might like to think, speak back to the actual historical conditions of labor.
Antonioni' s art cinema spectators seem to behave rather like his art cinema characters. In responding to Antonioni' s stylized, lacunar representation of Giuliana' s experience, as well as to Vitti' s opaque performance style, spectators who watch her onscreen are encouragedcoerced, even-to share a fundamental thoughtful sensitivity towards the world.
Film historians, art theorists, and cultural producers have made various attempts to address the intersection of immaterial labor and cultural production. Film historians Michael Goddard and Benjamin Halligan, for instance, treat immaterial labor very straightforwardly as a set of representational contents in American and European cinema. 21 Some artists have been playfully insidious in their approach to the question of immaterial labor. Carey Young's mixed media The Representative (2005), for instance, featured the installation of a telephone in a museum on which visitors were invited to ring a call center agent, hired especially for the installation, who would answer questions about her own life and work in a call center. (The media listed in the work's specifications are as follows: "Professional call centre agent, direct dial telephone connection, two telephones, chair, lamp, table, framed photo of call centre agent." 22 ) What scholarship like that of Goddard and Halligan and artworks like Young's have in common is that both grasp immaterial labor as a literal object of representation. I am interested in thinking about immaterial labor, however, in contexts where it does not appear by name. I see it operative in Bordwell's theory of art cinema narration and spectatorship, and in art cinema spectatorship itself. The kind of cognitivism that underwrites Bordwell's theory could itself, in fact, be taken up as a symptom of various labor crises, as an index, and as a site of immaterial labor. Bordwell's theory-especially in his influential Narration in the Fiction Film (1985)-attempts to displace politicized 1970s film theory's account of the spectator-stupid and docile, in thrall to illusionism and far too lazy-and replace it with an account of a spectator who is always already at work-who is working to produce the film's meaning through an (apparently) enjoyable sequence of cognitive activities.
Whereas 1970s theory sought to break the spell of illusion by pointing to the film as work-as artifice, as a thing made through labor under specific laboring conditions-Bordwell wants to show us that as spectators we are always already happily at work and should be (the lesson seems to be) even happier when we realize that we have been doing so much work all along. 23 Bordwell's theory of narration, which he elaborates in Narration in the Fiction Film, is catalyzed by a desire to convert passive consumption to active production. After surveying standard theories of cinematic narration in this book's first two chapters, Bordwell's third chapter, entitled "The Viewer's Activity," begins by noting that these theories "have little to say about the spectator, except that he or she is relatively passive." 24 Unlike the theories-especially the politicized semiotic theories of the 1970s and early 1980s-that suggest the spectator is "positioned" by the cinematic apparatus, Bordwell argues instead that "a film cues the spectator to execute a definable variety of operations." 25 The rhetoric of Bordwell's description of what it is a viewer does while watching a film is completely compatible-in fact it is uncannily similar-to the rhetoric that describes the work of the immaterial laborer: "In opposition to all passive notions of spectatorship, . . . we should consider film viewing a complicated, even skilled, activity." 26 While I am perfectly willing to admit that if Bordwell finds accounts of spectatorial "passivity" unconvincing, he is more than legitimate in producing what he believes will be a better, or more accurate, theorization. But there is more to passivity than mere passive spectatorship: the film theoretical discourse of the passive spectator, from Adorno and Horkheimer to Stephen Heath, however right or wrong it might be about the spectator's lazy stupefaction, was not only intent on demonstrating this passivity per se; rather, passivity, and the way in which cinema induces such passive states, was understood as fundamentally linked to the cinema's power as an ideological tool. Bordwell's theory might be prompted by a desire to show that we are not so easily duped, that in fact we exercise a certain amount of autonomy over the cinematic image-that we, in a limited sense, control it, not it us.
Technically, Bordwell's concerns are local to film studies, a discipline that emerged in the 1960s-concomitantly with the rise of art cinema, it must be noted. I do not mean to suggest that his work is broadly influential beyond the confines of film studies, but I see it, and in particular its theorization of art cinema spectatorship, as a useful articulation of how one of the most privileged modes of cultural production in the 1960s and '70s-the art film-is historical contemporaneousness and shares a conceptual, material, and rhetorical homogeneity with immaterial labor. (This move, I should also acknowledge, would probably be dismissed by Bordwell as yet another instance of the "symptomatic interpretation" often applied to film texts and other forms of cultural production.) 27 Could the experience of art cinema itself-the attitudes, preoccupations, affects, and, yes, the labors that it inculcates and extracts from its spectators-be a mode of absorbing the surplus labor power of an educated urban and suburban middle class, or the training ground of this same class, a pedagogical forcing house in which the future subjects of immaterial labor are taught its rhythms and gestures? And could cognitive film theory be an apologetic discourse for immaterial labor? While my concerns in this article are directed at art cinema, and while Bordwell's theory of art cinema spectatorship most neatly maps onto immaterial labor, his cognitivist film theoretical project-one in which passivity is renamed activity, laziness is exchanged for skill, and leisure activities are rebranded as occupations that are useful for a post-Fordist labor market-could be seen as a compensatory and apologetic discourse that canonizes the immaterial labor of the film spectator as a legitimate pursuit, one that is eminently useful to capital, and that is, ultimately, productive of value. Whereas the paranoid or skeptical spectators desired by politicized 1970s film theory might imagine themselves (however naively) to interrupt such value production, cognitivist film theory and the activities of art cinema spectators are smoothly inserted into the information economy as canny consumers and producers. 28 In his recent exploration of what he calls "the cultural logic of control," Franklin has written that "the spatiality and temporality of labor . . . expand under the images of the human as computing machine and the social as digital communication system." 29 Bordwell's account of film spectatorship turns the spectator into something like a computational subject, a person less rapt by identification, or enraged by ideologized (mis)representation of reality, than he is adroitly responding to the input fed to him by the film onscreen. Art cinema is a kind of input that asks this subject to engage in a kind of pleasurable overtime labor. Moreover, if, as Franklin argues, "networked accumulation . . . requires constant stimulation," then the vaunted seriality of cinephilic consumption-in which the art cinema filmgoers' discrimination consists in their almost indiscriminate compulsion to go to the cinema-exhibits certain features that ally it with post-Fordist patterns of value production and commodity consumption. 30 I want to question the benignity of what we are doing when we are watching film; to puncture the sense of self-satisfaction in attending to what is difficult or opaque in art cinema spectatorship, especially when that kind of attention is underwritten by an unquestioned belief in the value of labor as labor, as well as by the valorization of this spectatorship precisely because it can be understood as labor. I mean to question the degree to which our aesthetic commitments-our commitments to certain experiences that seem to be occasioned by particular modes of art-might absorb our political commitments, precisely because or especially when we are tempted to think of our aesthetic activities as being "hard," that is to say, as being labor. The foregoing is as much a problem for theory as it is for the practice of film going and other forms of artistic consumption. 31
>> Lessons from the Kitchen: Akerman's Reproductive Labors
The theorization and the discourse of immaterial labor overlap and intersect with, and, as a formalized theoretical project, are preceded by what has been termed both "reproductive" and "affective" labor. Italian feminists like Mariarosa Dalla Costa, writing with the American feminist Selma James, Silvia Federici, and Leopoldina Fortunati-all associated with the "wages for housework" polemics-each in various ways contributed to the theorization of "reproductive labor" (work predominantly carried out by housewives and prostitutes) in the crux of the labor crises of the 1970s. 32 In these accounts, not only the labor of housework, but the production of affects and affection (of the "love" that binds the family together) were claimed to produce value for capital. The theorization of reproductive labor not only anticipates the development of Lazzarato's immaterial labor, it also makes clear that the immaterial labor involved in reproductive labor is perhaps the most material of labors in that it requires states of extreme bodily intimacy that endure over long periods of time. Federici has, in fact, objected to the term "affective labor," which she believes is a "mystification" of the older term "reproductive labor." 33 What use can reproductive labor be for my consideration of art cinema's immaterial labor? One way of forcing this question might be by asking what Bordwell's theorization of art cinema spectatorship would have to tell us about another paradigmatic art film, but one that arrives almost at the very end of what has been understood as the major cycle of this mode of film practice. The film in question is Chantal Akerman's Jeanne Dielman, 23 Quai du Commerce, 1080 Bruxelles (1975 , a film that demands its spectators endure very, very long takes of the eponymous character, played by Delphine Seyrig, performing the repetitive and laborious chores of housewifery. Across the film's narration we learn that Jeanne, a widow, is a part-time sex worker who entertains the odd paying john in her bedroom while her son is away at school. The vast majority of the labor we see in the film is Jeanne's reproductive labor, the labor of domestic care, a labor that is both immaterial-in the sense that it produces no commodity-but all too material in its exhaustion of the body and its attention to the psycho-sexual needs of Jeanne's clients. 34 I want to try to account for the distance that separates Giuliana from Jeanne, while holding to what brings them together. Spectators who labor to understand Jeanne (or the secret of her subjectivity) in the Bordwellian sense perforce perform the role of the immaterial laborer. However, this labor-required of them by the film's style-undergoes a further redefinition here. Whereas in earlier phases of art cinema production and reception, art cinema spectators labored to understand the film's meaning, here they simply spend time watching Jeanne perform her housework, care for the needs of her son and her clients. I want to suggest that this labor of endurance-a labor demanded by the film-functions as a kind of corrective to what might have seemed at times the purely cognitive demands of earlier forms of art cinema.
One way of trying to grasp these shifts presents itself via a formal continuity between Antonioni's style and Akerman's, both of which have been understood as forerunners to what has recently been termed "slow cinema." 35 While Akerman shares and radicalizes Antonioni's slowness, I want to point to another formal trope that they share, and that, it could be suggested, Akerman actually cites from Antonioni. I am thinking of the insistent decision to shoot the female protagonist in a medium shot in which the actor's back is turned to the camera. This rather radical innovation on Antonioni's part, which became familiar to viewers of his work across the four films that Seymour Chatman has termed the "great tetralogy": L'avventura (1960) , La notte (The night, 1961) , L'eclisse (The eclipse, 1962) , and Red Desert. All four films feature Monica Vitti (though in La notte she plays a supporting role to Jeanne Moreau's lead) and all four focus on the intense but mostly incommunicable female (urban, bourgeois) experience. Chatman describes Antonioni's frequent shooting of the female actress from the back, a formal decision that alienates the prospect of easy identification that we associate with access to a character's face: "The back shot avoids giving us any direct information about her reactions. . . . [W]e must form our own opinions about the significance of what the protagonist has seen." 36 The view from behind frustrates access to character subjectivity, prolongs uncertainty, and cues spectators' mental efforts to determine what the content of the character's thoughts might be. By shooting Jeanne from behind, Akerman deforms the function of this formal gesture. When confronted with the spectacle of Jeanne's back, the question that spectators ask themselves, especially when Jeanne is doing the dishes at the kitchen sink, is not so much "What is she thinking?" but rather "Why am I being made to endure this?" The duration of such a shot, in which we see the fullness of a menial task in all its phenomenological complexity, definitely frustrates an accustomed (and highly conditioned desire) for something to happen, especially for something meaningful to happen. Even in Antonioni's films, when the plot feels to have been emptied, the film is refilled by a sense of emotional fullness. In Akerman's film, however, we do not torture ourselves over what Jeanne is feeling, or what Akerman is "saying" as Bordwell would put it. Rather, we are exposed to and forced to endure, for the duration of the film's three hours and twentyone minutes, the slow time of a real body performing (mostly) unwaged labor. The film is hard work, but not in the terms offered by Bordwell.
The view from behind as a frustration of the spectator's access to character subjectivity in Red Desert.
The view from behind as a potentially frustrating exposure to the duration of labor in Jeanne Dielman.
Delphine Seyrig in the film's eponymous role complicates and enriches the manner in which Akerman both cites and confounds the legacy of art cinema. At the time of the film's production, Seyrig embodied a living archive of art cinematic practice, and the decision to cast her in this particular role, to invite her to perform the labor of representing Jeanne Dielman performing her labor, foregrounds the work of the film's stylistic and formal operations. In a comprehensive assessment of Akerman's work, Ivone Margulies writes that Seyrig's "image reverberates with earlier European art cinema." 37 Not only does her body refer back to the canonical art films in which she herself acted (Alain Resnais's Last Year at Marienbad [1961] for instance), but, as Margulies considers in some detail, the image of Seyrig/Jeanne as prostitute resonates with Jean-Luc Godard 's Two or Three Things I Know About Her (1967) and that film's representation of a woman who casually combines the work of housewifery and prostitution. 38 More significantly than this frequency of intertextual allusion is the film's emblematization and even incarnation of the urgent concerns of feminist theory and practice at the moment of the film's production. Margulies writes of the necessity of placing Jeanne Dielman "in this precise moment," in order to understand the film's mediation of Jeanne as a type-an abstract figuration of the political concerns of feminism-as an irreducible particular; 39 she emphasizes that what she calls the film's "hyperrealism" prevents the presentation of "an essentialist view of woman." 40 The representation (or presentation) of (affective, domestic, reproductive) labor is key to understanding this mediation. Margulies quotes Akerman saying in an interview that her desire was "to simplify a reality to such a degree that on seeing Delphine Seyrig making coffee one sees all women making coffee." 41 But in a different interview, Akerman's comments both confirm and contradict the universality of this formulation. On the one hand, Akerman argues that if she "had chosen a nonprofessional actress for the role of Jeanne, she wouldn't be more than that single woman. Because she is an actress, she represents all other women." 42 Here the professionalized and specialized labor of the actor, who produces affects and affective states in exchange for pay, secures the film's cognitive work; or rather the actor's labor frames the film's address to another cognitive and affective laborer-the spectator. On the other hand, however, Akerman goes on to say that Seyrig's specific function, the function of her laboring performing body, works (so to speak): "because she brought with her all the roles of mythical woman that she played until now. The woman in Marienbad, the woman in India Song." 43 In other words, instead of granting access to a universalized figure of woman, really what Akerman offers the (art cinema) spectator is an invitation to perform the cognitive task demanded by (art cinema) intertextuality: to rifle through the history of Seyrig's performances, or her work as an actor. This work differs from the work of the art cinema spectator as posited by Bordwell, which is to read for "maximum ambiguity." The cognitive labor that Akerman's film requires is slightly more material, at least insofar as it sends us back to the question of work itself-the work of the actor (who is working overtime, or twice over: as an actress who is actually performing the labors of a housewife). The art cinema spectator staring at Monica Vitti's back in Red Desert is, I would argue, less concerned with Vitti's work as an actress and more concerned with the fictional thoughts ascribed to the character of Giuliana. The spectator of Jeanne Dielman, on the other hand-who is both an art cinema spectator and a post-art cinema spectator-is concentrated on the materiality of Delphine Seyrig's body itself, and on the prior material scenes of previous art cinema spectatorship that comprise the history (the working curriculum vitae) of Seyrig's work. So indelible is the impression of these performances and the mode of art cinema that they embody, that the critic may still find herself asking some rather Bordwellian questions. Analyzing the spectator's experience when Jeanne first falters in the performance of her monotonous routine and ends up burning the potatoes, Margulies evokes thus the spectator's cognition: "We become aware of the passion that might exist under Jeanne's calm expression, and we retrospectively start to read this seemingly unchanged expression as reflecting the growing anguish of silence." 44 I do not think that Margulies is wrong to evoke the spectator's thoughts, but the evocation also suggests the stubbornness with which the residue of art cinema's love affair with ambiguity refuses to be scrubbed away. In fact, I would suggest that Akerman's use of Seyrig, as well as the representation of Jeanne's increasingly erratic actions, which result in the film's explosive denouement, are experimental attempts at testing the limits of the art cinema model of filmmaking and film spectatorship. The question that Akerman sets herself and her spectators is this: how much material endurance of temporal duration is necessary to exhaust the subjective claims of art cinema's fixation on character interiority and the immateriality of subjectivity that spectators apply to this interiority? Margulies credits Seyrig's "stylized" performance as key to the production of an "alienation" that combines with Akerman's own formal stylization-described as an "intense attention to details (formal and otherwise) superimposed on a culturally given narrative matrix (melodrama)"-that "corrodes naturalism from within." 45 By "naturalism," I think Margulies means the realist representation of character subjectivity-a subjective realism that courses through a film like Red Desert. In other words, Jeanne Dielman attempts to rematerialize, through its style, what was always already densely material in immaterial labor and in the art cinema practices that inculcate it. Insofar as the viewer's time watching the film is co-temporal and nearly identical to Jeanne's performance of her housework, one wonders if a film like this, encountered as a late moment in the historical development of art cinema, does not leave the spectator with too little to do-and too much to endure.
Insofar as the viewer' s time watching the film is co-temporal and nearly identical to Jeanne' s performance of her housework, one wonders if a film like this, encountered as a late moment in the historical development of art cinema, does not leave the spectator with too little to do-and too much to endure.
In their essay "Counterplanning from the Kitchen," published the same year that Jeanne Dielman was released, Silvia Federici and Nicole Fox would write that "behind every factory, behind every school, behind every office or mine there is the hidden work of millions of women who have consumed their life, their labor, producing the labor power that works in those factories, schools, offices, or mines." 46 Federici and Fox make the argument that women are justified in demanding a wage for their hitherto unpaid reproductive labors. "To say that we want wages for housework is the first step towards refusing to do it, because the demand for a wage makes our work visible, which is the most indispensable condition to begin to struggle against it, both in its immediate aspect as housework and its more insidious character as femininity." 47 Clearly the demand for a wage for housework is a transitional demand, and an important one, one in which the stakes of visibility are high. Kathi Weeks has diagnosed one of the contradictions in this discursive and political field: "the perennial feminist problem of how to make visible and contest the gender divisions of labor in relation to the construction of subjectivities and hierarchies without reproducing naturalized models of gender dualism and relying on familiar brands of identity politics." 48 Theorists of immaterial and reproductive labor have, according to Weeks, been too ready to assume "a model of the self prior to its estrangement." 49 Works of art and readings of works of art that attend to these concerns might fall prey to the same problem.
Jeanne Dielman perhaps too perfectly illustrates the rhythms and textures of reproductive labor. It might be seen as too clear an attempt to make visible reproductive labor's historic invisibility. The film, however, anticipates this objection, I think, by way of one of its most controversial strategies: its refusal to represent Jeanne's sex work in any great or explicit detail. The film shows Jeanne's clients arriving and then-in a consistent use of rather radical ellipses-she shows them the door, pausing long enough for them to pay her on their way out, as she hands them their coats. We could imagine-and some feminist critics have protested-that by not showing the actual sex the film mystifies that work. The film has been accused of mystifying sex work in the same measure that it demystifies housework. 50 But Akerman's decision to abandon these scenes to the invisibility of the temporal ellipsis resonates with the critiques of the theory of immaterial labor that have more recently been produced by the same feminists who pioneered the wages for housework movement.
Three passages from a recent essay by Federici help us to address this problem. First: "There is a continuum between the computer worker and the worker in the Congo who digs coltan with his hands trying to seek out a living after being expropriated, pauperized, by repeated rounds of structural adjustment and repeated theft of his community's land and natural sources." 51 Second: "The fundamental principle is that capitalist development is always at the same time a process of underdevelopment." 52 Third: "We established that capitalism is built on an immense amount of unpaid labor, that it not built exclusively or primarily on contractual relations; that the wage relation hides the unpaid, slave-like nature of so much of the work upon which capital accumulation is premised." 53 Federici's argument here asks us to confront the way in which logics and economies of visibility and invisibility continue to haunt capitalist labor and valorization processes in ways that are both new (the computer worker's immaterial labor) and old (the extractive colonialism in the Congo). The ability to picture exploitative labor practices in one context will always, under capitalism, be accompanied by a failure to make visible exploitation elsewhere.
Despite Jeanne Dielman's extravagant, excessive visualization of the most mundane details of everyday domestic life, I would argue that the film itself betrays a skepticism about its ability to make visible the terms of reproductive labor; it follows, then, that the film emits a skepticism regarding the critical purchase of the visible itself. We might consider that by leaving Jeanne's sex scenes outside the frame, the film gestures in the direction of the labor that we will never see, even when we live amid the commodities that this labor produces and alongside the bodies that this labor exhausts. The film questions the status and efficacy of the visible; and it questions in particular the capacity of cinema itself-with its durational, "realist" ability to bear witness-to make visible. It points to something outside the grasp of the cinematic-to something that, perhaps necessarily cinema is very good at indicating, but that it itself can never remedy. In refusing these scenes of work, the film suspends the question of art's efficacy to account for labor. But perhaps even more importantly, the film challenges the valorization of labor itself.
The conditions evoked-summoned-by Akerman's film at the time of its release in 1975 have continued to mutate in the intervening decades. At the same time, however, the film ruthlessly captures the phenomenology of the kinds of care work that have become increasingly typical in the twenty-first century: ever-accelerated automatization, new forms of capital accumulation and value extraction, the normalization of precarious forms of labor (the gig economy, the side hustle), and a deterioration of working conditions even for formerly reliable models of white collar employment. Each of these trends redefines human labor. While we resist these developments with the political means at our disposal, perhaps we should also encumber ourselves with yet another task, a task that takes us beyond cinema, beyond the discourse and practice of valorization itself. Recognizing labor, representing it, drawing attention to its obscured modalities, with however much care and attention, while certainly laudable projects, do not intervene in the process of value production for capital: we do not need to demystify capital, but rather to destroy it. 54 The task, instead, is to reimagine our world and our ways of living in it, to refuse the premise that how well or how much we work will offer the means by which we measure our worth. Our job, if we still want to employ that term, is to discover ways of being that are measureless and therefore without value. 
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